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GHOST IN THE “NEW MACHINE”:
HOW ALICE EXPOSED
SOFTWARE PATENTING’S CATEGORY MISTAKE
Andrew Chin*

The Alice Court’s characterization of computer programming has
effectively repudiated, inter alia, the doctrine that programming a
general-purpose computer creates a patent-eligible “new
machine.” This Article revisits In re Bernhart, the first holding
based on the “new machine” principle, concluding that the Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals committed a category mistake in
conducting its nonobviousness analysis. This suggests that § 101
has a unique role to play in ensuring the analytical coherence of
the other tests for patentability, and that step two of the
Mayo/Alice test could helpfully enforce the doctrinal distinction
between a patent-eligible “method or means” and an unpatentable
“result or effect.”
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I. THE “NEW MACHINE” RATIONALE
In re Alappat, 1 once a mainstay of the Patent Office’s
Guidelines for Examining Computer-Related Inventions,2 and its
doctrinal principle that programming a general-purpose computer
creates a patent-eligible “new machine”3 are already fading into
history. Not much was left of this principle after the Federal
Circuit reviewed Alice’s patents en banc,4 and even less remains
now that the Supreme Court has concluded “mere recitation of a
generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea
into a patent-eligible invention.”5 Consequently, the agency’s postAlice Interim Guidance on Patent Subject Matter Eligibility6 makes
1

33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc).
See Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions, 61 Fed. Reg.
7478 (Feb. 28, 1996) (citing Alappat nine times).
3
Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1545 abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (citation omitted) (“We have held that such programming creates a new
machine, because a general purpose computer in effect becomes a special
purpose computer once it is programmed to perform particular functions
pursuant to instructions from program software.”).
The Alappat court also reasoned that the claimed programmed generalpurpose computer was “not a disembodied mathematical concept which may be
characterized as an ‘abstract idea,’ but rather a specific machine to produce a
useful, concrete, and tangible result.” Id. at 1544. It was not until State Street
Bank, however, that the Federal Circuit elevated Alappat’s “useful, concrete,
and tangible result” language into a test for patent-eligibility. State St. Bank &
Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(“Today, we hold that the transformation of data, representing discrete dollar
amounts, by a machine through a series of mathematical calculations into a final
share price, constitutes a [patent-eligible invention] because it produces ‘a
useful, concrete and tangible result. . . .”) Since the Federal Circuit abrogated
this test in In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 959–60, it has no bearing on Alappat’s “new
machine” principle as discussed in this Article.
4
See CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en
banc) (Lourie, J.) (plurality opinion) (“Not only has the world of technology
changed, but the legal world has changed. The Supreme Court has spoken since
Alappat on the question of patent eligibility, and we must take note of that
change.”).
5
See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2358 (2014).
6
See United States Patent and Trademark Office, Interim Guidance on Patent
Subject Matter Eligibility, 79 Fed. Reg. 74618 (Dec. 16, 2014) [hereinafter
Interim Guidance].
2
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no mention of Alappat, the leading case in support of the
principle.7 In its place are lists of examples purporting to illustrate
the otherwise undefined8 category of unpatentable abstract ideas9
and the kinds of additional claim elements that may provide the
requisite “significantly more” to impart patent-eligibility.10
Yet Alappat has lessons to impart before it is sent into oblivion.
First, Alappat remains an important precedent concerning the
interpretation of functional language in software patent claims
under § 112(f). As argued elsewhere,11 the Federal Circuit’s claim
construction in that case is both rhetorically and logically
unconnected to the “new machine” principle, and properly
illustrates the kinds of computer technologies that may be found
sufficiently concrete in a specification to support a claimed meansplus-function element.12
Second, it is time for patent-eligibility doctrine to recognize the
now-discredited “new machine” principle for what it has always
been: an abdication of § 101’s13 essential role in guarding against
mistakes that could otherwise arise in the patentability analysis of
software-implemented inventions. Dissenting in In re Bilski,14 the
Federal Circuit’s former Chief Judge Randall Rader suggested
such a role for patentable subject matter doctrine in finding Bilski’s
hedging claim facially abstract without resorting to the en banc
majority’s machine-or-transformation test:
When considering the eligibility of “processes,” this court should focus
on the potential for an abstract claim. Such an abstract claim would
7

See id. at 74624.
See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2357 (“In any event, we need not labor to delimit the
precise contours of the ‘abstract ideas’ category in this case.”); Bilski v. Kappos,
561 U.S. 593, 621 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“The Court, in sum, never
provides a satisfying account of what constitutes an unpatentable abstract
idea.”).
9
See Interim Guidance, supra note 6, at 74622.
10
See id. at 74624.
11
Andrew Chin, Alappat Redux: Support for Functional Language in Software
Patent Claims, 66 SMU L. REV. 491, 500 (2013).
12
Id. at 500–01.
13
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
14
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (Rader, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
8
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appear in a form that is not even susceptible to examination against
prior art under the traditional tests for patentability. Thus this court
would wish to ensure that the claim supplied some concrete, tangible
technology for examination. Indeed the hedging claim at stake in this
appeal is a classic example of abstractness. . . . Hedging is a fundamental
economic practice long prevalent in our system of commerce and
taught in any introductory finance class. In any event, this facially
abstract claim does not warrant the creation of new eligibility
exclusions.15

Judge Rader’s approach merits close study, because the Supreme
Court’s Bilski majority essentially adopted it in its own opinion
rejecting the machine-or-transformation test.16
Even before Alice, 17 the “new machine” principle had been
criticized often enough to earn the derisory nickname “The Old
15

Id. at 1013.
Judge Rader prefigured the Supreme Court’s rejection of the en banc
majority’s project of elevating machine-or-transformation from a clue to a
definitive test, and took existing Supreme Court precedents as sufficient
guideposts for finding Bilski’s claimed method to be “facially abstract.” Id. at
1013. The sole factual basis underlying the Supreme Court majority’s rejection
of Bilski’s claims was Judge Rader’s characterization of hedging. Bilski v.
Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (quoting In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1013
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (Rader, J., dissenting)); see also id. at 606 (citing In re Bilski,
545 F.3d at 1015) (agreeing with Judge Rader’s findings of “difficulties” with
the en banc majority’s machine-or-transformation test). The Court proceeded
immediately from this characterization to the conclusion that Bilski’s claims
were unpatentably abstract, just as Judge Rader had done. Id.
Underscoring the fundamental importance of this analytical mistake-avoiding
function is the fact that Judge Rader’s post-Bilski opinions generally take a
narrow view of the abstract-idea exclusion, limiting its application to where
abstractness “exhibit[s] itself so manifestly so as to override the broad statutory
categories of eligible subject matter and the statutory context that directs
primary attention on the patentability criteria of the rest of the Patent Act.”
Research Corp. Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859 (Fed. Cir.
2010); Ultramercial v. Hulu, 722 F.3d 1335, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2013), vacated, 134
S. Ct. 2870 (2014) (citing Research Corp.). In fact, Judge Rader’s dissent in
Alice may turn out to be the last Federal Circuit opinion to cite Alappat for its
“new machine” rationale. See CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269,
1302 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Rader, J., dissenting) (citing Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1544–
45). Abstractness in patent claims appears, to Judge Rader’s mind at least, to
exhibit itself most manifestly in the form of analytical errors inherent in
applying “the patentability criteria of the rest of the Patent Act.”
17
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2358 (2014).
16
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Piano Roll Blues.”18 The implied comparison, as the government
argued in Gottschalk v. Benson, was to “the insertion of a new
piano roll into an old player piano,” which may enable the piano to
play a new song, but should not be considered “a patentable
‘discovery.’”19 Former Chief Judge Glenn Archer’s Alappat dissent
appealed to the analogy at length, concluding that “[t]he only
invention by the creator of a roll that is new because of its music is
the new music,”20 which is nonstatutory subject matter. Still, the
player-piano characterization of the “new machine” principle
played no role in the Alice decision, nor did it offer any insight into
the nature of the patent-eligibility inquiry after Alice.
This Article offers a new and more constructive criticism of the
“new machine” principle: i.e., that it provided an opening for the
kinds of category mistakes in patentability analysis that § 101
should serve to prevent, and that its repudiation in Alice should be
an occasion for doctrinal realignment with this mistake-preventing
purpose. Part II provides a brief explanation of category mistakes
and the analytical difficulties they present for the law generally and
patent law specifically. Part III traces the “new machine” principle
back to its origin in In re Bernhart, 21 in which the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals made the category mistake of
concluding that six pages of algebraic simplifications were too
difficult for “one of ordinary mathematical skill” to perform.22
As Part IV discusses, Alice is irreconcilable with the “new
machine” principle and the patent-eligibility determination in
Bernhart. This suggests that the two-step patent-eligibility test
outlined in Alice23 and Mayo24 could be coherently focused on the
salutary purpose of preventing future category mistakes in
patentability analysis. Consistent with Supreme Court software
18

Old Piano Roll Blues, PETER GROVES, A DICTIONARY OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW 220 (2011).
19
Government’s Opening Brief, Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
20
Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1567 (Archer, J., dissenting).
21
417 F.2d 1395 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
22
See id. at 1402.
23
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014).
24
See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs, 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1297–
98 (2012).
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patent doctrine, the abstract-idea exclusion could enforce the
longstanding distinction between a patent-eligible “method or
means” and an unpatentable “result or effect.” Part V concludes
with a brief discussion of future work.
II. AN INTRODUCTION TO CATEGORY MISTAKES
This section introduces category mistakes and the doctrinal
difficulties that result from them. This Article will argue Alice’s
repudiation of the “new machine” principle should be viewed as an
opportunity for the patent system to recognize § 101’s role in
preventing category mistakes in patentability analysis. Over the
centuries, various philosophers have attempted to answer the
question “What is there?” by classifying the world’s entities25 into
broad ontological categories26 that can be the subject of meaningful
discourse. 27 Two criteria for a successful classification are that
(1) the set of categories is complete, i.e., each entity in the world
belongs to one and only one category; and (2) attributes are
category-specific; i.e., an attribute that can belong to entities in one
category cannot be an attribute of entities in any other category.28
A category mistake occurs when an entity is placed in the
wrong category or is given an attribute that only entities in another
category can have.29 “This memory is violet,”30 “Caesar is a prime
number,”31 and “Colorless green ideas sleep furiously”32 are examples
25

An entity is “something that exists by itself” or “something that is separate
from other things.” Entity Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.
merriam-webster.com/dictionary/entity (last visited Apr. 15, 2015).
26
Ontological knowledge is “one’s conception of the basic categories of
existence, of what sort of things there are.” FRANK C. KEIL, SEMANTIC AND
CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT: AN ONTOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 457 (1979).
27
The first such effort is credited to Aristotle. See ARISTOTLE, CATEGORIES
(J.L. Ackrill trans., 1963) (listing substance, quantity, quality, relation, place,
date, posture, state, action, and passion).
28
Category, in THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 122–23 (Robert
Audi ed., 1999).
29
Id. at 123.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Noam Chomsky, Three Models for the Description of Language, 2 IRE
TRANSACTIONS ON INFO. THEORY 113 (1956).
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of category mistakes as they often manifest themselves in
unintelligible or absurd discourse.
Some category mistakes, however, are exposed only through
deeper analysis. A famous example is Gilbert Ryle’s argument
against Rene Descartes’s mind-body dualism, which he
characterized as “the dogma of the Ghost in the Machine:”
[The dogma] maintains that there exist both bodies and minds; that
there occur physical processes and mental processes; that there are
mechanical causes of corporeal movements and mental causes of
corporeal movements.33

Ryle’s critique depends on a more extensive argument that
physical processes and mental processes belong to distinct
categories, so that “it makes no sense to conjoin or disjoin the
two.”34 That is to say, Descartes commits a category mistake.
Similarly, as Steven Smith argued in Law’s Quandary, the
ontological categories constructed by law can obscure even
pervasive gaps between a society’s consciously held beliefs about
ontological categories and “the ontological assumptions that are
implicit or presupposed in practice and ways of talking.”35 Lawyers
and laypeople alike speak of “the law” as if it were a real entity,36
but it is far from clear that the legal community can account for
“the law” in a careful inventory of its ontological commitments.37
We may all be speaking “nonsense.” 38 For example, Smith
problematizes the writing of dissenting opinions, noting that they
“typically assert that the majority has misstated the law . . . . What
could this kind of talk mean if the judicial decision is law?”39
A recent article40 conducted an inventory of the ontological
commitments surrounding the category of “useful Arts” in the
discourse of patent law, in which “claims are novel kinds of
33

GILBERT RYLE, THE CONCEPT OF MIND 11 (Julia Tanney ed., 2009).
Id. at 11–12.
35
STEVEN D. SMITH, LAW’S QUANDARY 16 (2007).
36
Id. at 13.
37
Id. at 19–22.
38
Id. at 30.
39
Id. at 58 (emphasis in original).
40
See generally Andrew Chin, The Ontological Function of the Patent Document,
74 U. PITT. L. REV. 263 (2012).
34
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embodiments; and embodiments are entities whose properties
include essential causal powers, and whose possible existence is
therefore warranted by scientific essentialism and scientific
realism.”41 A wide range of patent doctrines, including patentable
subject matter, utility, anticipation, infringement, constructive
reduction to practice, written description, enablement, and claim
construction all support this ontological picture.42
Following naturally from patent law’s long-recognized status
as “the most metaphysical branch of modern law,”43 its adherence
to this system of ontological commitments through so many
doctrinal ramifications necessitates a distinctive role for the
patentable subject matter requirement in policing against category
mistakes.44 Like Descartes’s “Ghost in the Machine,”45 the “new
machine” principle is a dogma that falsely conjoins mathematical
inferences with the category of “useful Arts”: a category mistake
that, in Bernhart, had spectacularly far-reaching consequences. It
should have had no place in § 10146 doctrine. We now turn to that
story.
III. THE CATEGORY MISTAKE IN BERNHART
Despite the importance of the Bernhart case to the histories of
both software patents and computer technology, it has received
little attention in contemporary debates over the patenting of
software. But the “new machine” principle it articulated and the
category mistake it allowed continued to hold legal significance for
nearly four decades.
In 1961, Boeing employees Walter Bernhart and Bill Fetter
41

Id. at 323.
Id.
43
Hogg v. Emerson, 47 U.S. 437, 485–86 (1848); see also Rohm & Haas Co.
v. Dawson Chemical Co., 599 F.2d 685, 706 (5th Cir. 1979) (citing Judge Rich’s
comment that “patent law is ‘the metaphysics’ of the law”).
44
See Chin, supra note 40, at 268 (“The advantage of such an approach is that
any resulting doctrinal proposals can find warrant not only on policy grounds
but also importantly as metaphysically necessary consequences of settled legal
principles.”).
45
See RYLE, supra note 33.
46
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
42
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filed a patent application 47 for a computer system capable of
drawing two-dimensional representations of three-dimensional
objects. Bernhart and Fetter, who are credited with coining the
term “computer graphics,”48 would have to wait eight years for the
U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals to award them their
patent.49 Hundreds of firms, including Disney, expressed interest in
licensing the technology,50 and Computerworld heralded the issued
patent as “the first true software patent.”51
Bernhart and Fetter’s claimed system included a “general-purpose
digital computer” programmed to calculate a series of coordinates
{(vi , wi )} representing the projections of object points {( x i , y i , z i )}
from a viewpoint ( x e , y e , z e ) onto the plane located at k times the
distance from the viewpoint to the origin and normal to the line
between them. The calculation was to be based on the formulas:

vi =
wi =

k ( x e2 + y e2 + z e2 )(− y e x i + x e y i )

[

( x e2 + y e2 ) ( x e2 + y e2 + z e2 ) − ( x e x i + y e y i + z e z i )

]

k ( x e2 + y e2 + z e2 ) ⎛ − x e z e x i − y e z e y i + z i ( x e2 + y e2 ) ⎞
⎜ 2
⎟
⎜ ( x + y 2 + z 2 ) − ( x x + y y + z z ) ⎟
( x e2 + y e2 )
e
e
e
e
i
e
i
e
i
⎝
⎠

The system also included a planar “plotting machine” for
plotting the points {(v i , wi )} on paper. The “plotting machine”
could use any known output technology for this purpose, including
ink pens, cathode ray photography, or electrostatic paper.52
The Patent Office had rejected the system claims under § 101
because their point of novelty consisted of the mathematical
equations used to program the computer.53 On appeal, the U.S.
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals acknowledged that equations
were excluded from patentable subject matter, but found that the
47

U.S. Patent No. 3,519,997 (filed Nov. 13, 1961).
39 COMM. ARTS MAG. 216 (1997).
See In re Bernhart, 417 F.2d 1395 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
50
Firm Wins Battle for Mechanical Cartoonist Patent, GREAT BEND DAILY
TRIB., May 1, 1970, at 1.
51
COMPUTERWORLD, July 29, 1970, at 2.
52
See U.S. Patent No. 3,519,997 at cols. 4-6 (filed Nov. 13, 1961).
53
Bernhart, 417 F.2d at 1398.
48
49
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system claims in issue would not preempt all uses of the recited
equations:
[A] member of the public would have to do much more than use the
equations to infringe any of these claims. He would have to use them in
the physical equipment recited in the claim . . . . We should not
penalize the inventor who makes his invention by discovering new and
unobvious mathematical relationships which he then utilizes in a
machine, as against the inventor who makes the same machine by trial
and error and does not disclose the laws by which it operates.54

The comparison between the two inventors here appeals to the
longstanding principle that a patent applicant has no duty to
disclose a correct theory of operation.55 In making the comparison,
the court’s implication was that Bernhart and Fetter had not only
invented a new machine, but had performed a further public
service of disclosing its theory of operation, over and above the
amount of disclosure needed to patent it. In this account, the
mathematical equations played no part in the invention’s patenteligibility, which turned solely on the invention’s characterization
as a new machine.
The court then made the characterization explicit by way of
invoking the “new machine” principle for the first time as a
rationale for patent-eligibility:
[I]f a machine is programmed in a certain new and unobvious way, it is
physically different from the machine without that program; its
memory elements are differently arranged. The fact that these physical
changes are invisible to the eye should not tempt us to conclude that the
machine has not been changed. If a new machine has not been invented,
certainly a “new and useful improvement” of the unprogrammed
machine has been . . . . We are concluding here that such machines are
statutory under 35 U.S.C. § 101, and that claims defining them must be
judged for patentability in light of the prior art.56

54

Id. at 1399–1400 (emphasis omitted).
See Newman v. Quigg, 877 F.2d 1575, 1581–82 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
56
Bernhart, 417 F.2d at 1400. The court subsequently characterized the
“physical changes” resulting from programming a computer in categorical
terms, stating “once a program has been introduced, the general-purpose digital
computer becomes a special-purpose digital computer.” In re Prater, 415 F.2d
1393, 1403 n. 29 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (dicta); see also In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526,
1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc) (citing Prater) (“We have held that such
programming creates a new machine, because a general purpose computer in
55
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The court proceeded to review the Patent Office’s § 103
rejection of the Bernhart and Fetter’s claims in light of the prior
art. Unbeknownst to the Boeing scientists, a very similar patent
application, filed in 1960 by Bernard Taylor, Jr., was already
pending in the Patent Office.57 Taylor had claimed a system with
special-purpose circuitry for calculating and outputting the coordinates
of a planar projection of a three-dimensional object. Taylor’s
circuits calculated the coordinates ( f 1 , f 2 ) representing the projections
of an object point C = (c1 , c 2 , c 3 ) from a viewpoint A = (a1 , a 2 , a 3 )
onto the plane passing through the point B = (b1 , b2 , b3 ) and normal
to the line between this point and the viewpoint. Taylor’s application
disclosed the following expressions for f 1 and f 2 :
f1 = d1 Ψ / λ
d1 = e12 + e22 + e32
(e1 , e2 , e3 ) = ((a1 − b1 ), (a 2 − b2 ), (a3 − b3 ) )
Ψ=

e3ω
− d 2γ 3
d2

ω = e1γ 2+e2 γ 1
(γ 1 , γ 2 , γ 3 ) = ((a1 − c1 ), (a 2 − c 2 ), (a3 − c3 ) )
d 2 = e12 + e22

λ = ω + e3 γ 3
f2 =

(a1 − b1 ) 2 + (a 2 − b2 ) 2 + (a3 − b3 ) 2
(a1 − b1 ) 2 + (a 2 − b2 ) 2

•

(a1 − b1 )(a1 − c 2 ) − (a 2 − b2 )(a1 − c1 )
(a1 − b1 )(a1 − c1 ) + (a 2 − b2 )(a 2 − c 2 ) + (a3 − b3 )(a3 − c3 )

When rewritten solely in terms of A and C (with B set to the
origin), these expressions simplify to the following representations
effect becomes a special purpose computer once it is programmed to perform
particular functions pursuant to instructions from program software.”).
57
U.S. Patent No. 3,153,224 (filed Feb. 23, 1960).

634

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 16: 623

of Bernhart and Fetter’s equations:

f2 =

(a12 + a 22 + a 32 )(a 2 c1 − a1 c 2 )

[

(a12 + a 22 ) (a12 + a 22 + a 32 ) − (a1 c1 + a 2 c 2 + a 3 c 3 )

]

a12 + a 22 + a 32 ⎛ − a1 a 3 c1 − a 2 a 3 c 2 + c 3 (a12 + a 22 ) ⎞
⎜ 2
⎟
f1 =
2
2
⎜
⎟
a12 + a 22 ⎝ (a1 + a 2 + a 3 ) − (a1 c1 + a 2 c 2 + a 3 c 3 ) ⎠
In fact, an enterprising patent examiner performed these
algebraic simplifications over six pages of manuscript, showing
that for (a1 , a 2 , a3 ) = (kx e , ky e , kz e ) and (c1, c2 , c3 ) = (xi , yi , zi ),
Taylor’s formulas calculate the same projection coordinates
( f2 , f1 ) = (vi , wi ) .58 Accordingly, the Patent Office rejected Bernhart
and Fetter’s claims as obvious over Taylor’s application59 in light
of known programmed computer systems with plotters.60
The court was not persuaded by the Patent Office’s algebra,
finding that it amounted to a hindsight reconstruction of Bernhart
and Fetter’s equations:
There is nothing in the record to suggest that there was any possibility
of the simplified programming claimed by the applicants in claim 19.
The Patent Office belatedly . . . attempts to show that Taylor's
equations can be manipulated to an identity with the [applicants’]
equations . . . . In so doing the solicitor has had the benefit of seeing
applicants' equations, and with this hindsight a mathematical identity is
revealed. There is nothing to suggest that, within the context of
automated drawing, one of ordinary mathematical skill armed with the
Taylor reference would be able to discover the simpler equations which
are the basis of the claimed programming.61

Hindsight is a legitimate concern for courts and patent examiners
when inquiring into whether a claimed invention was nonobvious
at the time it was made.62 In formulating an obviousness rejection,
there can be a “temptation to read into the prior art the teachings of

58

Brief for the Commissioner of Patents at 13–18, In re Bernhart, 417 F.2d
1395 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
59
See id. at 6.
60
See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 3,066,868 (filed Nov. 15, 1956).
61
Bernhart, 417 F.2d at 1402.
62
KSR Int’l. Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007).
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the invention in issue,”63 thereby understating the difficulty of the
problem that would have faced a person having ordinary skill in
the art at the time of invention. The Bernhart court’s
characterization of the patent examiner’s calculations, however, is
strained at best.

Figure 1 - Graphical representation of Bernhart and Fetter’s projection equations.

The reason Bernhart and Fetter’s equations are simpler than
Taylor’s is that the former apply only to the special case where the
normal from the viewpoint (26 in Figure 1) to the projection plane
(28) passes through the origin (30). Once the coordinates b1 , b2 , b3
drop out of Taylor’s equations, the expressions are greatly simplified,
and it is a straightforward exercise in first-year algebra to solve for
f 1 and f 2 in terms of A and C . From these simplified equations,
expressing {(v i , wi )} in terms of {( x i , y i , z i )}, ( x e , y e , z e ) and k
requires only a change of notation. Bernhart and Fetter’s equations
63

See Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1, 36 (1966).
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immediately follow from Taylor’s prior art disclosure as a special
case, at least to one of ordinary skill in ninth-grade mathematics.64
In short, the court’s determination as to what a person of “ordinary
mathematical skill” would be able to do with a particular set of
algebraic equations is problematic, because it grossly
underestimates the mathematical abilities of the patent’s intended
audience.
Even more fundamentally, the court’s notion of an inventor
“discovering new and unobvious mathematical relationships” and
its interposition of “mathematical skill” for the predicate of
“ordinary skill in the art” constitute category mistakes. This is
because the attributes of nonobviousness and ordinary skill in the
art are inapplicable to the mathematical derivation of equations
(and the category of the mathematical arts more generally). As the
Supreme Court acknowledged in Flook and reiterated in Bilski,
even previously unknown mathematical properties must be
“assumed to be within the prior art” at the outset of a patentability
determination. 65 Moreover, a § 103 66 inquiry into the level of
ordinary skill in the art67 is misplaced where the art in question,
and the field of knowledge being advanced by the patent
disclosure, is not one of the “useful Arts,” but mathematics.68 The
patentability analysis of a claimed software-implemented invention
64
The nonobviousness analysis is not changed by characterizing Bernhart and
Fetter’s as a species selected from a prior art genus. See generally MPEP
2144.08 (9th ed., Mar. 2014). On the other hand, Taylor’s equations are not
readily deducible from Bernhart and Fetter’s disclosure, which offers no
indication as to how to calculate the coordinates of a projection onto a plane
located elsewhere in space.
65
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593,
610 (2010) (quoting Flook).
66
35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012).
67
Graham, 383 U.S. at 17.
68
See id. at 6 (quoting U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8) (“Innovation, advancement,
and things which add to the sum of useful knowledge are inherent requisites in a
patent system which by constitutional command must ‘promote the Progress of
. . . useful Arts.’”).
Since the claimed system in Bernhart becomes obvious once the “new”
equations are assumed to be within the prior art, it also fails the historical
requirement that “a patent-eligible invention must reflect invention in the
application of otherwise ineligible science, nature, or ideas.” Joshua D. Sarnoff,
Patent-Eligible Inventions After Bilski: History and Theory, 63 HASTINGS L.J.
53, 72 (2011).
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should never leave a court in the position of determining how hard
the math was.
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Bernhart in Light of Alice (and Vice Versa)
There can be little doubt that Bernhart would have been
decided differently after Alice. The claims in Bernhart are facially
directed to patent-ineligible mathematical equations. The
remaining system elements are recited in means-plus-function
format69 and supported in the specification by broad disclosures of
“a general-purpose digital computer,” “a plotting machine,” “the
input devices of the computer,” and “the output of the computer.”70
A representative figure from the disclosure is reprinted in Figure 2.71
Read together, these claim elements constitute only a “wholly
generic computer implementation” 72 that “cannot transform a
patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.”73
Under Alice, a general-purpose computer programmed to evaluate
mathematical formulas would not have been characterized as a
“new machine” but rather as an unpatentable abstract idea. This
conclusion to the § 101 analysis would have obviated Bernhart’s
category mistake in its § 103 inquiries.

Figure 2. Block diagram of Bernhart and Fetter’s claimed system.
69

See U.S. Patent No. 3,519,997, supra note 47, at cols. 1–3.
Id. at col. 4.
71
See id. at fig. 1.
72
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2358 (2014).
73
Id.
70
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Bernhart thus reveals a previously hidden role for the
patent-eligible subject matter inquiry after Alice: preventing future
category mistakes in connection with “examination against prior
art under the traditional tests for patentability.”74 When conducting
the Alice/Mayo analysis in light of this role, however, not all cases
will be as clear as Bernhart, even within the limited field of
software-implemented inventions.75 Fortunately, a doctrine dating
from the Industrial Revolution and reaffirmed by the Supreme
Court in Diamond v. Diehr76 can supply the ontological distinctions
necessary to illuminate the potential for category mistake.
B. The “Method or Means” Requirement
Since at least the 1850s, patent-eligibility has required that
claims be limited to a particular method or means for bringing
about a desired effect, rather than the effect itself. 77 Diehr
74

In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (Rader, J.,
dissenting).
75
For an empirical survey of the diverse levels of abstraction involved in the
technical disclosures of “software patents,” see Martin Campbell-Kelly &
Patrick Valduriez, A Technical Critique of Fifty Software Patents, 9 MARQ.
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 249 (2005).
76
450 U.S. 175 (1981).
77
LeRoy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (1852) (“A patent is not good for an
effect, or the result of a certain process, as that would prohibit all other persons
from making the same thing by any means whatsoever. This, by creating
monopolies, would discourage arts and manufactures, against the avowed policy
of the patent laws.”). In Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 268 (1853), the
Supreme Court extended this principle to machines as well as processes, stating,
“It is for the discovery or invention of some practical method or means of
producing a beneficial result or effect, that a patent is granted, and not for the
result or effect itself.”
Joshua Sarnoff has pointed to an even earlier expression of the “method or
means” requirement in Justice Story’s 1840 decision in Wyeth v. Stone. In that
case, Justice Story found that a patent could not validly be “for any mode
whatsoever of cutting ice by means of an apparatus, worked by power, not
human, in the abstract, whatever it may be . . . .” Wyeth v. Stone, 30 F. Cas.
723, 727 (C.C.D. Mass. 1840). Such a patent, Story reasoned, “is void, as it is
for an abstract principle, and broader than the invention, which is only cutting
ice by one particular mode, or by a particular apparatus or machinery.” Id.
According to Sarnoff, Story’s reasoning amounted to a holding that a claimed
invention was limited to “only the inventive mode or apparatus embodying the
patented principle that was actually disclosed in the patent specification.” Joshua
D. Sarnoff, The Historic and Modern Doctrines of Equivalents and Claiming the
Future, Part I (1790–1870), 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 371, 390
(2005) (citing Wyeth).
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reaffirmed this bedrock principle for the software era. 78 This
distinction between a practical “method or means” and a beneficial
“result or effect” provides the requisite ontological categories for
identifying impermissibly abstract product and process claims
under my proposed approach.
The “method or means” requirement calls for a simple inquiry
into causality. A “method or means” is capable of making some
beneficial difference in the state of the world because of its use. A
“result or effect” that obtains in the world regardless of whether or
not such an intervening act takes place, in contrast, is “part of the
storehouse of knowledge of all men . . . free to all men and
reserved exclusively to none”79 and therefore cannot be preempted
from the public domain as the subject matter of a patent.80 This
preemption concern extends to claims that effectively cover all
applications of such a “result or effect” in a particular field of use
or technological environment, or additionally recite only
insignificant extra-solution activity.81
For example, consider the Pythagorean Theorem, a
paradigmatic example of an unpatentable abstract idea. 82 The
Pythagorean Theorem does not cause the square of the hypotenuse
of a right triangle to be the sum of the squares of the legs, although
it explains why this is so. Nor was this proposition caused by
Pythagoras or by any of the hundreds of other mathematicians who
have furnished proofs over the centuries.83 Rather, the Pythagorean
Theorem and its proofs simply reveal a relationship that has always
existed among the sides of a right triangle regardless of human
intervention.
78
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 n.7 (1981) (quoting Corning, 56 U.S.
at 268).
79
Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948).
80
See id. at 130–31 (rejecting claim to combination of bacteria species
because “[t]hey serve the ends nature originally provided and act quite
independently of any effort of the patentee”).
81
See id. at 132.
82
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 (1978); cf. STEWART SHAPIRO, THINKING
ABOUT MATHEMATICS: THE PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS (2000) (treating
mathematical objects as paradigmatic examples of noncausal abstractions).
83
See ELISHA S. LOOMIS, THE PYTHAGOREAN PROPOSITION (1968) (presenting
367 ways of proving the Pythagorean Theorem).
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Some applications of the Pythagorean Theorem are patentable.
For example, the “Cube Puzzle With Moving Faces” of U.S. Patent
4,872,682 is a product that can be made and used for beneficial
entertainment and educational purposes.84 It includes springs for
creating frictional forces between the sliding pieces and the
channels in which they slide as the faces of the cube are turned
manually. 85 These and other built mechanisms for transmitting
forces among the cube components can be accurately characterized
as means for causing the beneficial behavior of the cube. This is
true even though the Pythagorean Theorem can be used to verify
that a slider in the middle layer of the cube is dimensioned so that
it will not slide out of the mechanism when the top or bottom layer
is rotated.86 The claimed cube puzzle is a patent-eligible “method
or means” for causing beneficial configurations when its faces are
rotated by manual forces.
In contrast, consider a hypothetical patent claim directed to a
kinematic chain comprising three sequentially linked members
each having a given length, the longest of which is the square root
of the sum of the squares of the two shorter lengths, whereby the
members are constrained to form a right triangle when the linkage
is closed. If the term “member” in such a claim refers to any
structural element capable of being modeled geometrically as a
line segment of a given length without limitation as to the forces
that may operate on the member in use, then the claim effectively
preempts all uses of the Pythagorean Theorem in the field of
mechanical linkages. Since the Pythagorean Theorem is a property
that obtains in the world regardless of human intervention, the
claim should be found unpatentable under the “method or means”
requirement.
C. Harmonization with Supreme Court Jurisprudence
The “method or means” requirement is a unifying principle that
adheres to the Supreme Court’s recent software patent
jurisprudence in Bilski and Alice. The requirement, which closely
84

U.S. Patent No. 4,872,682 (filed Nov. 17, 1987) at col. 4.
Id.
86
Id. at cols. 8–9.
85
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tracks “the guideposts in Benson, Flook, and Diehr,”87 supports the
use of the machine-or-transformation test as an important, but not
definitive inquiry, in abstract-idea jurisprudence88 and clarifies the
role of the abstract-idea exclusion in guarding against inapposite
inquiries into novelty and nonobviousness.89
In Benson, the Court distinguished phenomena of nature and
abstract ideas from their “application . . . to a new and useful
end.”90 A claim to a phenomenon of nature, such as the rejected
claim in O’Reilly v. Morse,91 manifests itself by coverage so broad
that “it matters not by what process or machinery the result is
accomplished.”92 Similarly, the Court found Benson’s challenged
claims “so abstract and sweeping as to cover both known and
unknown uses of the BCD to pure binary conversion,” and processes
that could “be performed through any existing machinery or
future-devised machinery or without any apparatus.”93 In contrast,
the claimed chemical tanning and dyeing processes in Corning
were “sufficiently definite to confine the patent monopoly within
rather definite bounds.”94
The Court’s reasoning in Benson applies with equal force to
any claim that fails the “method or means” requirement. Logically,
it is only with respect to a claim directed to a “practical method or
means of producing a beneficial result or effect” that coverage is
contingent on “by what process or machinery the result is
accomplished.”95
In Flook, the Supreme Court credited the patent applicant with
finding “a new and presumably better method for calculating alarm
limit values”96 by applying a new algebraic formula to variables

87

Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 621 (2010).
Id.
89
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc).
90
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972) (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co.
v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948)).
91
56 U.S. 62 (1853).
92
Id. at 113.
93
Benson, 409 U.S. at 68.
94
Id. at 69.
95
Id. at 68 (quoting Morse, 56 U.S. at 113).
96
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978).
88
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involved in the catalytic conversion of hydrocarbons.97 The Court
characterized the applicant’s new algorithm as an expression of a
scientific principle that “reveals a relationship that has always
existed,”98 like Newton’s equation expressing the law of universal
gravitation,99 and the algorithm therefore must be “assumed to be
within the prior art.”100 The Court’s conclusion—that a “merely
heretofore unknown” expression of a “theretofore existing
phenomenon or relationship”101 is not the kind of “‘discover[y]’
that the statute was enacted to protect”102—applies with equal force
to any property or principle (such as the Pythagorean Theorem)
that obtains in the world regardless of whether or not any
intervening causal act takes place.103
In Diehr, the Supreme Court found a process of curing
synthetic rubber that used the well-known Arrhenius’ equation to
determine the appropriate cure time as patent-eligible.104 Noting
that “[t]ransformation and reduction of an article ‘to a different
state or thing’ is the clue to the patentability of a process claim that
does not include particular machines,”105 the Court characterized
Diehr’s claimed invention as a patent-eligible process involving
“the transformation of an article, in this case raw, uncured
synthetic rubber, into a different state or thing.”106
The Court distinguished the claimed invention from a
mathematical equation, noting that the claim would only “foreclose
from others the use of that equation in conjunction with all of the
other steps in their claimed process.” 107 Such “steps” included
“installing rubber in a press, closing the mold, constantly
determining the temperature of the mold, constantly recalculating
the appropriate cure time through the use of the formula and a
97

Id.
Id. at 593 n. 15 (citation omitted).
99
Id.
100
Id. at 594.
101
Id. at 590, 593 n. 15.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981).
105
Id. at 184 (quoting Benson, 409 U.S. at 70).
106
Id.
107
Id.
98
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digital computer, and automatically opening the press at the proper
time.”108 These steps can be accurately characterized as comprising
a practical method for causing the rubber to be cured. More
generally, any process that causes the beneficial “transformation of
an article . . . into a different state or thing” constitutes a “method
or means of producing a beneficial result or effect.”
In accordance with Bilski’s precepts, the “method or means”
requirement not only follows “the guideposts in Benson, Flook,
and Diehr,”109 but also provides a rationale for treating the Federal
Circuit’s erstwhile machine-or-transformation test as a “useful
and important clue” to guide the abstract-idea inquiry. 110 The
transformation prong, which calls for “a particular transformation
of a specific article,” 111 simply represents the physical
manifestation of a concrete beneficial difference in the state of the
world that is produced by the claimed invention. Moreover, while
the Federal Circuit never specified the criteria necessary for
satisfying the machine prong of the test, 112 a claimed machine
might reasonably be deemed patentably concrete by virtue of a
108

Id.
As other scholars have observed, a significant difficulty in interpreting
Bilski is that the last two of the “guideposts in Benson, Flook and Diehr” are not
in alignment. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Prometheus Rebound:
Diagnostics, Nature, and Mathematical Algorithms, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 341,
343 (2013) (observing that Diehr and Flook “reach opposing conclusions on
similar facts and are difficult to reconcile”); John M. Golden, Flook Says One
Thing, Diehr Says Another: A Need for Housecleaning in the Law of Patentable
Subject Matter, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1765, 1781 (2014) (noting the “clear
tensions . . . between the differing language and holdings of Diehr and its
predecessor Flook”); Mark A. Lemley et al., Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REV.
1315, 1335–36 (2011) (noting that Flook’s point of novelty approach was
“essentially overruled a few years later in Diehr”). The foregoing discussion,
however, shows how each case on its own terms can be reconciled with the
“method and means” requirement. Cf. Mayo Collab. Servs. v. Prometheus Labs.,
132 S. Ct. 1289, 1299 (2012) (distinguishing Flook from Diehr based on how
the Flook Court “characterized the claimed process”).
110
See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 658–59 (2010) (noting Court
consensus on status of the machine-or-transformation test).
111
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 957 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc).
112
See id. at 994 (Newman, J., dissenting) (“We aren’t told when, or if,
software instructions implemented on a general purpose computer are deemed
‘tied’ to a ‘particular machine.’”).
109
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user’s ability to produce a beneficial difference in the state of the
world.
Finally, Alice draws an especially sharp distinction between a
patent-eligible “method or means” of causing a beneficial change
in the state of the world113 and an ineligible “result or effect” that
obtains in the world regardless of whether or not such intervening
acts takes place. 114 In the context of software solutions, the
“method or means” requirement forces patent claims to be limited
in scope and directed to specific entities and processes whose
effects in the real world are learned through empirical observation,
not stipulated as mathematical properties of abstract models or of
computer system components disclosed in “purely functional and
generic”115 terms.
It bears noting that the computer science community is already
prepared to lend its expertise to such an inquiry. The requirement
that a patentable invention be “causal” closely corresponds to a
distinction that philosophers of computer science, most notably
James Fetzer116 and Aaron Sloman,117 have drawn among different
kinds of machine abstractions, and even different areas of
computing research.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court long ago articulated a simple, generally
applicable doctrine defining the scope of patent-eligible subject
matter that can provide considerable clarity to the allowable extent
113

See Alice v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2359 (2014) (finding that the
method claims do not “purport to improve the functioning of the computer
itself” or “any other technology or technical field”).
114
See id. (finding that the method claims “simply recite the concept of
intermediated settlement as performed by a generic computer.”).
115
Id. at 2360.
116
See James H. Fetzer, Program Verification: The Very Idea, 31 COMMUNICATIONS
OF THE ACM 1048, 1057 (1988) (describing the “causal factors” underlying the
performance of a simple compiler-ready Pascal program).
117
See Aaron Sloman, What Cognitive Scientists Need to Know About Virtual
Machines, in PROC. 31ST ANN. CONF. COGNITIVE SCI. SOC’Y 1210, 1214–15
(N.A. Taatgen & H. van Rijn, eds. 2009) (arguing that running virtual machines
supervene on a complex of physical causal processes whose emergent behavior
is not amenable to mathematical verification).
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of abstraction in software patent claims: “It is for the discovery or
invention of some practical method or means of producing a
beneficial result or effect, that a patent is granted, and not for the
result or effect itself.”118
Unfortunately, since the 1960s the courts and the Patent Office
have been distracted from this clear categorical distinction by the
recurring specter of the “new machine” principle. Of course, just as
not all software is mathematics,119 not every software patent is
predicated on the “new machine” principle or the miscasting of
mathematics as one of the “useful Arts.” As I have shown,
however, both the “new machine” principle and the category
mistake that gave rise to it attended the birth of the first software
patent. As Alice lays the ghost to rest, it is time for the courts to
recognize the original rationale for software patent-eligibility in
Bernhart as a mistake that will never again be repeated.

118

Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 268 (1853).
See Andrew Chin, On Abstraction and Equivalence in Software Patent
Doctrine: A Response to Bessen, Meurer and Klemens, 16 J. INTELL. PROP. L.
197, 233–37 (2009) (citing Ben Klemens, The Rise of the Information Processing
Patent, 14 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L.J. 1, 10 (2008)) (responding to Ben Klemens’s
claim that “all software is mathematics”).
119
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